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In thinking about the Constitution, we should keep in mind
the commonplaces that lace our thinking. We must keep them in
sight at both levels: content and character, commonplace and
commonplaceness-else their importance may escape us.
Maitland's view that "the history of law must be a history of
ideas" is one such commonplace. Another was noticed by
Edward Corwin: the "commonplace that every age has its own
peculiar categories of thought; its speculations are carried on in a
vocabulary which those who would be understood by it must
adopt . . ... I These are two of the commonplaces of our
time, and if true they suggest two related propositions:
First, any understanding of historic institutions must take
account of the permeating ideas, the political and social
determinants of thought, and the vocabulary and conceptual
apparatus of the age in which the institution was developed.
Understanding begins when we can see an institution through the
screen of values that were the common coin of the time, the
commonplaces which are the "fecal remains ' 2 of the age. To put
the matter thus leads to the second proposition. If the fecal
remains of a time are to be found in its commonplaces those of
today must include the commonplaces of which Maitland and
Corwin spoke. The commonplaces of our age, theirs included,
are the concrete expressions of our own value system, through
the screen of which we view our times (and past times as well).
Our commonplaces are the intellectual shards and detritus that
will survive us. This can be summarized in still a third
commonplace, one stated by H. Stuart Hughes: "By now nearly
all of us have accepted Croce's dictum that the writing of history
necessarily changes with the standpoint of the historian, that all
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history is contemporary in the sense that its presentation reflects
the circumstances and attitudes of those who write it." 3 Our
commonplaces, therefore, remind us in their briefest form, that
conclusions about history (and law) must take account of value
systems of the present, as well as value systems of the past.
Where the impulse is felt to see history "as it was," it must
express itself in heeding the requirement to adopt old values, and
in the conscious shedding of new ones. When this is done, it is
said that history in both its senses is realized. It is created and
recreated by a principle of empathy by which Herder, for one,
would have us share the sense of history with its actors. This
impulse is the spirit of historicism which demands a special
"understanding" (in Dilthey's sense) through which we feel what
it was like to be historic. This spirit has been expressed recently
by an historian: "[w]e involve ourselves not simply by reasoned
inference from the overt facts of the Athenians' behavior but by
an imaginative and emotional grasp of the events." 4 The historicist
therefore rejects universals as transitory prejudices, and elevates
the Zeitgeist as an intellectual tool. This spirit is pervasive today,
and its articulated forms are a hallmark of most research into
the past. As a wayward example, consider the words of an
archeologist, Geoffrey Bibby, in his book The Testimony of the
Spade (1956). Bibby's dedication is inscribed
TO VIBEKE

who keeps before me the question without which archeology is
meaningless:
"What did it feel like-to be prehistoric?"

This impulse is felt in law as well, especially when the focus
is on basic documents and the concern is in raising "parchment
barriers" against encroachments on freedom. Here we can
observe that an implicit distinction is made between measuring
motive in legislation and finding meaning in a constitution.
There is a natural impulse to look behind doubtful legislation for
legislative motive. But an institutional resistance to the impulse
is offered by a canon of interpretation which bids us not to look,
3. Hughes, Is Contemporary History Real Historr., 32 AMERICAN SCHOLAR 516,
518 (1963), "It is a platitude that research in history as in other areas of science selects
and abstracts from the concrete occurrences studied, and that however detailed a
historical discourse may be it is never an exhaustive account of what actually happened."
4. Arragon, History's ChangingImage. 33 AMERICAN SCHOLAR 222, 229 (1964).
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especially when the legislature's motive is arguably illict. Now it
is true that attentiveness to the canon is a sometime thing,5 but
its restraint still holds out an appeal here and abroad.6 Where
doubt touches upon a document more basic than statute,
however, the canon is made to yield to argument that state
action is unconstitutional or ultra vires the document in question.
Questions of motive are transformed, and are said to be really
questions of meaning behind a charter In this transformation,
questions about the document begin to blur the distinction
between meaning and motive; and the spirit of historicism begins
to move the undertaking.
The purpose here is to examine, not so much the propriety of
such questions, but the utility of the answers, especially answers
supplied by historical research into the Constitution and its intellectual roots. It may be asked in this connection whether such
research is useful or useless, conclusive or to the contrary, relevant
or irrelevant to constitutional inquiry. Historiography may be useful, possibly conclusive, yet irrelevant. The purpose here, however,
is to examine possibilities rather than relevance-that is, usefulness and conclusiveness.
The impulse to defer to the historian in constitutional
interpretation is strong. It owes its strength not merely to a
laudable curiosity about a most prized institution, but also to a
laudable desire to seek principles of interpretation which are at
once authoritative and public, durable and viable. Two
distinguished members of the Supreme Court, who knew more
history than most, have expressed a variant of this impulse. In a
1914 opinion, Justice Holmes had this to say of constitutional
provisions: "Their significance is vital not formal; it is to be
gathered not simply by taking the words and a dictionary, but by
considering their origin and their line of growth. ' 8 In more
recent times, Justice Frankfurter made a similar observation:
5. Compare O'Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) with Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
6. United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 298-99 (1935); Collins v. Minister of
Interior, S. Afr. L.R. 552, 565 (App. Div. 1957 (1)); Frankfurter, Some Reflections on
the Reading of Statutes, 2 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 213, 230-31 (1947).
7. Compare Harris v. Minister of Interior, 1952 (11) S. Afr. L.R. 428 (App. Div.)
with Collins v. Minister of Interior, S. Afr. L.R. 522, 565 n.6 (App. Div. 1957 (1))
(marking, respectively, the beginning and ending of the South African constitutional

crisis).
8. Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914); see also Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416,433 (1920).
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"The language of the First Amendment is to be read not as
barren words found in a dictionary but as symbols of historic
significance illumined by the presuppositions of those who
employed them."
In the Holmes-Frankfurter view, interpretation is not an
hour's consultation with a dictionary; but neither is it an hour
with a history book, consulted as a narrative of events that are
called upon to speak for themselves. A concern for history of
quite a different sort is required, a history that looks backward
to "presuppositions" to be sure, but one that also looks forward
to a "line of growth." This latter would be a history not of
atomic or irreducible events (written say by Ranke or Beveridge),
nor of the signal "acts of definite men, or even of a definite
man"' 10 (say Madison or Jefferson), but a history that is
significant, and significant not least of all from the standpoint of
our conscious convictions and our unconscious presuppositions
of social utility. It would be a history written instrumentally, a
history written not by some or all historians of the Constitution,
but by the Court itself.
To many this is a most unsatisfactory view. What is
demanded rather is an objective history of the Constitution, free
of the prejudices and predelictions of its institutionalized
interpreter. What is desired is a definitive history that is wholly
extrinsic to temporary arrangements and that supplies principles
that are truly neutral. Thus, Justice Sutherland was heard to
complain that "[t]he whole aim of construction, as applied to a
provision of the Constitution, is to discover the meaning, to
ascertain and give effect to the intent, of its framers and the
people who adopted it . . . . As nearly as possible we should
place ourselves in the condition of those who framed and

adopted it.'"' The impetus here is away from the
instrumentalism of language and concepts which so characterized
the rhetoric of the realist movement. It was an earlier phase of a
class of criticism which more recently sees all too much of the
Court's work as "result-oriented,' 2 or insufficiently geared to
9. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 523 (1951).
10. POUND, INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY, 118 (1923).

II. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 453 (1934) (emphasis
added).
12. E.g.. Griswold, OJ Time and Attitudes-ProjessorHart and Judge Arnold, 74
HARV. L. REV. 81 (1960).
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principles "that in their generality and neutrality transcend any
immediate result that is involved. ' 13 Such reaction wants
meaning from the Constitution which is abiding and a set of
terms in which we could "discuss the Constitution on the one
correct and indubitable level," free "from the parts, passions
and fallibilities of man. ' 1 4 These terms for discussion, it is urged,
are those very ones supplied by the text, and where their meaning
is doubtful we seek it in an "original understanding." This
seems very simple and straight-forward, but it remains to be
shown whether such methodology is either desirable or possible. I
suggest, however, that the historical search for meaning can be
confronted more directly on its own ground-in terms of its
possibility and efficacy.
Let's examine then what is proposed by the textualisthistoricists in their quest for meaning. The proposal is to find the
original understanding in terms of the meanings and motives of
the framers, illumined by their "presuppositions" as we may
discover them by placing ourselves in their "condition."" 1
Difficulty initially arises from the sheer effect of passage of time
on the connotation of words. If, for instance, we are to discover
Madison's intentions, we must heed his warning against "errors
which have their source in the changed meaning of words and
phrases."' 6 This, however, does not seem to be an insuperable
difficulty, so long as we consider such meaning changes as
7
simply a reshuffling of synonyms in a dictionary.1
More troublesome is the recurring doubt that mere
realignment of synonyms can really provide a sense of
participation in the understanding of the original words or their
contemporaneous synonyms. This doubt ensues when we realize
that "the meanings of symbols are defined and redefined by
socially coordinated actions. The function of words is the
13. Weschler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 17 (1959).
14. BEARD, Historiography and the Constitution, in THE CONSTITUTION
RECONSIDERED 159 (Morris, rev. ed., 1968).
15. E.g., Miller, Some Pervasive Mvths About the United States Supreme Court.
10 ST. Louis U.L. REV. 153, 165-168 (1965); A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH, 98-110 (1962).
16. Corwin, supra note I, at 366.
17. As supplied, for instance, by W. Crosskey, who sets out "to provide the reader
with a specialized dictionary of the eighteenth-century word-usages . . . which are needed
for a true understanding of the Constitution .... ." I W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE
CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 5 (1953)..
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mediation of social behavior, and their meanings are dependent
upon this social behavioral function. Semantical changes are
surrogates and foci of cultural conflicts and group behavior."' 8
A change in meaning, then, is mediated not only directly by the
passage of time, but also indirectly through social restructuring.
This restructuring both causes and is caused by shifts in the
meaning of languages and attaches to a noun "a kind of
invisible adjective, and [to] a verb an invisible adverb."'" "Along
with language, we acquire a set of social norms and values. A
vocabulary is not merely a string of words; inherent within it are

societal textures-institutuional and political coordinates."'"
Thus while we can find for an ancient word a.synonym which is
not proleptic, there is no guarantee that we can discover the
original connotation, or that we can grasp the commonplace
character of a chance phrase.

The best of our profession were not blind to such
considerations: "What is below the surface of the words and yet

fairly a part of them? Words in statutes are not unlike %wordsin
a foreign language in that they too have 'associations, echoes,
and overtones."'' And Justice Holmes: "The statutes are the
outcome of a thousand years of history .

. .

. They form a

system with echoes of different moments, none of which is
2
entitled to prevail over the other."

Our concern at this second level of complexity has been with
language and its meaning, but it is also an aspect of still a third
and larger dilemma-that of the inherent frailty of any hope of

achieving scientific objectivity in the historian's recreation of the
past. Such hope is extinguished in the process of self-awareness.
We are, after all, what we are; and the conceptual apparatus that
18. C. WRIGHT MILLS, Language, Logic and Culture, in THE COLLECTED ESSAYS OF
C. WRIGHT MILLS, 423, 432 (I. Horowitz, ed. 1963).

19. K. BURKE,

PERMANENCE AND CHANGE,

244 (1935).

20. Mills, supra note 18.
21. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 2 RECORD OF
N.Y.C.B.A. 213, 220-21 (1947).
22. Hoeper v. Tax Commission, 284 U.S. 206, 219 (1931). See also Plucknett,
Maitland's View of Law and History, 67 L.Q. REv. 179, 188 (1951) where F.W.
Maitland is quoted-as saying:
A lawyer finds on his table a case about rights of common which sends him to
the Statute of Merton. But is it really the law of 1236 that he wants to
know? No, it is the ultimate result of the interpretations set on the statute by
the judges of twenty generations. That process . . . is from the lawyer's point
of view an evolution of the true intent and meaning of the old law: from the
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we bring to bear on the history of men is ours not theirs. This
conceptual apparatus is shaped wholly by our "cultural
apparatus. ' 2 The latter has been variously called our
"Weltanschauung,"
the "climate of opinion," "forms of
sensibility and mental categories,"
and the "existential
situation" (e.g., Ernest Nagel) 4 Awareness that our world-view
is shaped by our condition, and our vision of the past is shaped
by the political and social coordinates of that condition, makes
clear the relativism and partiality of our view of the past. The
latter is but a segment and function of our world-view. And it
especially must be observed that this self-awareness has been, for
the last hundred years, a central feature of our world view,
overarching all others. Whatever the Weltanschauung of the
eighteenth century, no such feature was present, for the premises
of that century were the premises of rationalism-not
particularistic or partial, but universal and atemporal. But it is
on this feature that the textualist-historicist's quest for meaning
must founder. He concedes that he must recreate an eighteenth
century world-view, as portrayed in the "condition" and
"presuppositions" of the framers. But he supposes that
Weltanschauung can be recreated with the intellectual tools
which are both available and appropriate: (1) Primary sources
extrinsic to the Constitution in the form of publications, letters
and diaries of the framers, and (2) a reading of these primary
sources as an eighteenth century rationalist would read them.
Now from a certain point of view (e.g., rationalism), this is
appropriate and sufficient, for as Mannheim observed, "As far
as rationalism can see, the global outlook of an age or of a
creative individual is wholly contained in their philosophical and
theoretical utterances; you need only to collect these utterances
and arrange them in a pattern, and you have taken hold of a
Weltanschauung.'2 5 But in our terms that certain point of view
is a narrow one, for it does not take account of all the
determinants of the eighteenth century mind, nor does it
historian's point of view it is almost of necessity a process of perversion and
misunderstanding.
23. C. WRIGHT MIlLS, The Cultural Apparatus, in THE COLLECTED ESSAYS OF C.
WRIGHT MILLS, 405 (1. Horowitz, ed. 1963) 24 Nagel, The Logic of Historical Analysis,
74 THE SCIENTIFIC MONTHLY 162, 167 (1952). (In fairness to Professor Nagel, it should
be noted that he also put this overworked expression in quotation marks).
25. K. MANNHEIM, On the Interpretation of Weltanschauung, in ESSAYS O THE
SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE,

33, 38 (Kecskemeti, ed. 1952).
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guarantee that those of the twentieth century have been
discarded. From the broader point of view-our point of view
(whether from some still larger or transcendent view we are
"right" or "wrong" makes no difference)-the narrower view is
not possible to embrace. And were it in some sense possible, we
would still be warranted in asking for certification that the
historian had read his primary sources with Ben Franklin's
spectacles and not with his own contact lenses. Whether we like
it or not, we have been awakened from the dream that such is
possible or certifiable. Awakened from the dream of historicism,
and awakened to the ineluctible partiality of our conceptual
tools, we are thus made alive to the instrumental nature of our
concepts. Whether they are fashioned in history-writing or in
decision-writing, principles are not neutral; they are policyoriented; they are result-oriented. It cannot be otherwise.
The heritage of historical relativism has its roots in Europe,
and especially in the writings of Croce, Dilthey, and Mannheim.
But the United States also has had its able spokesmen for this
heritage; Carl Becker and Charles Beard, two influential
historians. I will return to Beard in a moment, but for the
present something should be said of our debt to Carl Becker. If
we take it as given that the chasm that divides us from the
eighteenth century mind is as wide as that which separates us
from the medieval mind, we may thank Becker for showing us
how it is so. In The Heavenly City of the 18th-Century
Philosophers (1932), the urbane and witty Becker makes this
point most tellingly, and makes us feel the gulf that divides us
from the rationalistic spirit which suffused the thought and
expression of Jefferson,2 Madison and others. It has been in the
textualist-historicist's failure to bridge that gulf (or their failure
to convince us that they have) that their major premise-the
premise that the framers' intentions are ascertainable in any
conclusive way-has foundered. This premise was bottomed in
the conviction that our "understanding" (again in Dilthey's
special sense) could be made to coincide exactly and at every
point with the "original understanding." Behind this conviction
lay a hidden but crucial premise: That there is available a
compass with which we can measure exactly the degree to which
26. See also C. BECKER, THE DECLARATION.OF INDEPENDENCE-A STUDY IN THE
HISTORY OF POLITICAL IDEAS (1922), on the rationalism of Locke and Newton at work
in the writing of Jefferson.
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our own angle of vision differs from that of the eighteenth
century eye. This compass was to be fashioned in total selfawareness, in an all-comprehensive picture of our own
Weltanschauung. Indeed, in his later years Charles Beard
proposed, by way of retreat from the relativism with which his
name had become associated, 27 that objectivity could be realized
through a systematic account of the interests that motivate an
historian, along with a parallel account of those interests of the
time of which he writes2 8 To the very end he adhered, I believe,
to the notion that these interests were predominantly economic,
and that a measure of the economic coordinates of our thought
would suffice.
One further but related point can be made from Beard's
own thought. In his early writing, Beard argued that the
Constitution was counter-revolutionary, and was more than
anything else an expression of the framers' need to protect the
vested and property interests of their class. 9 This view was quite
in vogue-until about 1937 when the constitutional crisis reached
a satisfactory culmination. It is a view which very recently has
been described as "no longer fashionable," and this "as a result
of the closer research conducted by investigators over the past
generation." 3 0 Now we may agree with that "result," but we
may still be warranted in questioning the reason offered for it.
Other research may have produced other views, but are the latter
dictated solely by the "closeness" of the research? Or is it not
so, as well, that such other views are simply more congenial to
the present climate of opinion regarding the Court and the
Constitution? And what warrant is there which assuredly dictates
one rather than the other? And finally what assurance do we
have that any research-whether the latest or the closest-is the
final or definitive word?
So much for the first hidden premise of the textualhistorical analysis of the Constitution. There are four other
subsidiary premises, all suppressed and all of them dubious: (1)
27. E.g., see

MANDELBAUM, THE PROBLEM OF HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE

(1938).

28. E.g., Beard, supra note 14.
29. C. BEARD, AN EcONOIIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (1913).
30. R.B. MORRIS. PREI-ACE, in THE CONSTITUTION RIECONSIDEREI) iX-X (Morris, ed.
1968). Presumably the "closer research" refers to that of B. Brown (Charles Beard and
the Constitution, 1956) and F. McDonald (We the People, 1958). See Forkosch, Who are
the "'People" in the Preamble of the Constitution?, 19 W. RES. L. REV. 644, 675 (1968).
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the assumption that the framers intended that we should seek to
ascertain their intention; (2) the assumption that the words and
phrases used by the framers adequately expressed their real
understanding of the Constitution; (3) the premise that any such
understanding was common or uniform, and for that matter (4)
that there was an understanding, in any acceptable sense, of each
and every Constitutional provision. As to the first, one recent
study concluded that "[t]he framers apparently did not 'intend'
that later generations look for their 'intent'."'" As to the third
and fourth-the premises that there was an original
understanding and that it was common or uniform-a further
remark is in order.
Historical inqury as to some "original understanding" (as
that phrase has been employed lately) has centered around the
Fourteenth Amendment: Professor Charles Fairman's study of
the due process and privileges and immunities clauses,3 2 and
Professor Alexander Bickel's study of the equal protection
clause 3 Professor Fairman's research, especially, gives the lie to
the notion that history will always supply a meaning. As one of
the sponsors of the privileges and immunities clause said himself,
"Its euphony and indefiniteness of meaning were a charm to
him." 3 This is not "understanding" in any sense, original or
otherwise.
Consider, too, the first amendment. The closest research
into the history of the free-speech-and-press provisions has been
that of Zechariah ChafeeP5 and Leonard Levy. 6 Levy's is also the
latest work, one that has been characterized as "awkward
history." It is awkward on several counts. First it shows that
our preconceptions about the original understanding differ from
the framers' own conceptions and understanding. More to the
31. Baldwin and McLaughlin, The Reapportionment Cases: A Study in the
ConstitutionalAdjudicative Process, 17 U. FLA. L. REV. 301, 322 (1964).
32. Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The
Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949).
33. Bickel, The Original Understandingand the Desegregation Decision, 69 HARV.
L. REV. I (1955).
34. Fairman, supra note 32, at 19. However, Fairman's is by no means the last
word: see Crosskey, Charles Fairman, "Legislative History," and the Constitutional
Limitations oJ State Authority, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1954); Avins, IncorporationoJ the
Bill of Rights: The Crosskey-FairmanDebates, 6 HARV. J. LEGIS. I (1968).
35. Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1948).

36. L. LEVY,

LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION

(1960).
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point, however, is Levy's conclusion that history is
inconclusive-inconclusive, that is, as to what the phrase "the
freedom of speech" meant historically, and inconclusive, further,
in the suggestion that the framers themselves had little or no
understanding of the phrase. This inconclusiveness stems not so
much from the scarcity of primary sources, as from the
observation that then as now men often give too little thought to
what they do or say. But inconclusiveness may stem also-to
recur to our original theme-from our incapacity to read the
invisible adjectives and adverbs in the primary materials that are
extant. Professor Levy's conclusions have been roundly
criticized,3 7 more often than not, I suspect, because they do not
square nicely with the climate of opinion. Moreover, much of the
criticism reflects the historicist's unhappiness with letting "facts
speak for themselves." Where they do not speak for themselves,
or where the facts say very little or say it unclearly, the
historicist feels the urge to become creative and to inject meaning
"by an imaginative and emotional grasp of the events. '38 Thus
one reviewer of Levy's work complained that "Levy's view lands
us in a solipsism of the present which finds the past always
external, formal, and genuinely unreal." 3 9 To this I would rejoin
that a solipsism of this kind is inevitable.
In support of my view that a "solipsism of the present" is
inevitable, let me summarize as follows. There are uses of
history. But it must be a cautious one, one heavily weighted with
the needs of our time and our common vision of the time. Beard
proposed that history would be in our grasp once the vision of
our age became clear. It has been proposed more recently by
McLuhan, Brzezinski and other smiling sponsors of the
technotronic age that we are about to grasp that total vision. By
some electronic leap, we are offered an escape from the political
and social determinants of our thought to that "utopian
mentality" described by Mannheim and sought for by Beard.
Yet it seems that for every door unlocked by a technotronic key,
several blinds get pulled down. Thus I confess I am more
inclined to the views of C. Wright Mills and Marcuse than the
technological and cultural apparatus renders our mentality more
37.
38.
39.
40.

E.g., Anastaplo, Book Review, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 735 (1964).
Arragon, supra note 4.
Mieklejohn, Book Review, 35 S. CAL. L. REV. 111, 118 (1961).
K. MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA, 173 (English ed., 1936).
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ideological than utopian, and that in a real sense we have
increasingly more trouble invisioning ourselves than we do our
ancestors. However that may be, there is truth in the contention
that, for now, no such total vision of ourselves has been supplied.
Our view of the past is seen through a tissue of values that only
seems transparent. To see that screen of values, we must see
through and yet with those values. Can any posture be valuefree? I suggest not; and I suggest particularly that history-writing
is value-ridden. But even to inquire whether it is one or the other
is not an inquiry that itself is assuredly value-free.
Correspondingly no answer can assuredly be value-free. Any
answer, objective or relative, then, is self-refuting. For when
Beard or Ernest Nagel argue that historical relativism is selfrefuting,38 they deploy arguments which by their nature are selfrefuting. Any attempt to assume a value-free posture regarding
history of the Constitution leads inexorably to the conclusion,
not simply that the Constitution should be the product of our
own time, but that it cannot be otherwise.
What our thinking on the Constitution requires is a set of
generative principles which transcend the two in fashion: That
the Constitution is only what its framers and historians have said
it is, or only what the courts say it is. The Supreme Court is not
an historian; or, has shown itself to be a rather poor one at
best.12 Clio, on the other hand, is a rather elusive witness; she
should not be summarily dragged into court to do its work. We
began with a commonplace which is ascribed to Maitland. When
we talk of law and history, it is fitting to conclude with
Maitland. "A mixture of legal dogma and legal history is in
general an unsatisfactory compound . . . . If we try to make
history the handmaid of dogma she will soon cease to be
43
history.
41. C. Beard, Written History as an Act of Faith, 39 AmER. HISTORICAL REV. 219,
226 (1934); Nagel, supra note 3.
42. A. H. Kelly, Clio andthe Court:An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 119.
119.
43. See material cited note 23 supra.

